The Resurrection of Jesus: Some Presuppositions

Assumptions and Presuppositions

There has been some discussion of presuppositions in our approach to interpreting and evaluating the evidence for the “Jesus Family Tomb.” I myself have suggested a presupposition or two on Dr. Tabor’s part. In his Jesus Dynasty blog, Dr. Tabor has made some observations about evangelical Christians who hold a literal and perhaps dogmatic view of the resurrection and ascension of Jesus

Many years ago, when I was a professor at the University of North Dame, the brilliant philosopher and theologian Philip Devenish, presented a rather provocative paper titled “Can a Christian be an Historian?” in our faculty forum. His essential argument was a simple one: historians ideally, by definition, investigate evidence and follow it wherever it leads; while orthodox Christians are committed to dogmas, many of which rest upon literal interpretations of “events” that are taken to be historical in nature, so that results are predetermined …

However, in the academic enterprise there is really no place, even on a topic as sensitive as this one, for prejudging the evidence. And ideally, one should not particularly “care” how it all comes out. In other words any kind of cultural or theological considerations should not come into play in evaluating evidence. In other words, there may be enough evidence to connect this tomb to that of Jesus and his family and there may not be, but the task is clear and singular–an open and undetermined examination of the evidence and a testing of hypotheses. [1]

… Ben and others who share his approach are not objectively examining evidence, but they are engaged in apologetic refutation. After all, this tomb could not have the ossuary of Jesus because Jesus ascended to heaven, bones, flesh, organs, and all … My intent is not to poke fun at Ben here, but just to say that he and many others who follow his points with celebration, share presuppositions that make objective historical inquiry a moot point. All results are determined before the investigation. [2]

I would like to explore the various presuppositions one might hold regarding the resurrection of Jesus and then examine how those presuppositions might color one’s assessment of the historical evidence

First, I suspect that there is a wide range of presuppositions, even among so-called “evangelical” Christians. My own are both philosophical and theological, and I publicly confess that they influence my interpretation and evaluation of any historical evidence. I consider miracles in general, and resurrection in particular, to be possible. This is admittedly a metaphysical position. I also have theological presuppositions which color my approach to the historical data. On the other hand, none of these presuppositions preclude my beliefs from being falsified by the historical evidence. In fact, when I first heard the 600: 1 claims of the filmmakers and observed the initial straw men responses from the evangelical academic community, I frankly was scared. The definite possibility occurred to me that among all of the imposters up to now claiming that the resurrection was a hoax, this one might actually be the real deal. I had mixed emotions. On one hand, I wanted Tabor to shut the hell up (I never really took Simcha seriously). On the other hand, I wanted to know the truth. So with heart in hands and an itchy trigger finger (mixed emotions and mixed metaphors), like so many others in Blogdom, I began sorting through the evidence, fully resolved and resigned to following it wherever it led.

I cannot speak for other Christians, but I expect that many are like me. On the other hand, I also believe that Dr. Tabor is right about some: They are not willing to make an objective assessment of the evidence.

Dr. Tabor himself has made no secret of his own presuppositions, and elsewhere has even offered them as an explanation for his historical methodology. For example, Dr. Tabor replies to Burge (writing in Christianity Today), who criticized The Jesus Dynasty as being “speculative.”

I suppose I should not at all find it surprising that Burge would characterize my work as “speculative.” After all, I do indeed “speculate” that Jesus had a human father, or that dead bodies don’t rise and walk around and eat and drink, talk to folks, and then rise up into the heavens. Therefore I assume that Jesus must have had the normal DNA that comes from a human mother and father, and that the if the tomb into which he was temporarily and hastily place after his execution was empty someone must have removed Jesus’ corpse. It is that simple. Since I know neither the father nor what happened to the body, but I do suggest a few possible speculative scenarios, I guess I have to plead guilty of “speculation.” But is there really any serious alternative? Seriously?

There are of course many things we don’t know with certainty about the historical Jesus, and when I can I try to fill in what one might reasonably suppose, and that could well be labeled speculation as well, but I think it is the “Jesus had a father” and “dead messiahs don’t come to life” assumptions that most hackle folk who take such things literally. [3]

Dr. Tabor explains his “speculation” as a reasonable alternative to assuming the resurrection of Jesus. In other words, he presupposes - before he approaches the evidence - that the resurrection is not a serious possibility. He more recently wrote:

And Jesus of Nazareth did die, and was buried, and his flesh did decompose and his bones were left [4]

And more recently yet:

In other words, to cut to the chase in terms of the Jesus movement, women do not become pregnant without a male, decaying corpses do not return to life … [5]

Four Categories of Presuppositions

I have attempted to clarify the presuppositions regarding the resurrection of Jesus by dividing them into four categories as follows:


(1) The resurrection is probable/certain, and the historical evidence must be interpreted to support it. This is what I would characterize as a “dogmatic theological” position. In this case, the strong belief in the resurrection is on grounds (theological, subjective experiential, unexamined, etc.) other than historical ones, and these presuppositions are imposed on their historical studies.

(2) The resurrection is possible, and the historical evidence can reasonably be interpreted to support it. This position is based on grounds (philosophical, theological or subjective experiential) other than historical ones, and may, to varying degrees, influence one’s interpretation of the historical evidence.

(3) The resurrection is possible, but the historical evidence cannot reasonably be interpreted to support it. This position is based on grounds (philosophical, theological or subjective experiential) other than historical ones, and may, to varying degrees, influence one’s interpretation of the historical evidence. In this case, theological grounds may be those of another religion, which may or may not influence one’s historical interpretation of the historical evidence.

(4) The resurrection is not probable/possible, and the historical evidence must be interpreted against it. In this case, the strong belief against the resurrection is on grounds (philosophical, theological, subjective experiential, unexamined, etc.) other than historical ones, and these presuppositions are imposed on their historical studies.


Presuppositions and Historical Inquiry

I cannot speak for Ben Witherington, but I would guess that he would be in the second category above. This would be my own position as well. Not all Christians, even those of the evangelical sect, come to their historical studies with category 1 presuppositions. In contrast, Dr. Tabor’s position seems to be in the fourth category.

Presuppositions such as those in categories 1 and 4 remind me of C.S. Lewis’s remarks about empiricism and the paranormal:

In all my life I have met only one person who claims to have seen a ghost. And the interesting thing about the story is that the person disbelieved in the immortal soul before she saw the ghost and still disbelieves in it after seeing it. She says that what she saw must have been an illusion or a trick of the nerves. And obviously she may be right. Seeing is not believing. [6]

In contrast to Lewis’s acquaintance, there is also the story of the two empiricists from rural Missouri driving down a country road past the Jones farm. The passenger sees Jones’s sheep in the pasture not far from the house and observes, “Looks like old Jones has recently sheered his sheep.” The driver looks over at the familiar pasture and after a moment or two cautiously replies, “Appears so,” and then adds the qualification, “at least on this side.”

I too am often skeptical of conclusions drawn too hastily from too little evidence. However, not being a native of the Show Me state, I, like most people, would probably have felt justified in drawing inferences about the sides of Jones’s sheep that were not visible to me, even if I had inside information that old Jones had an inexplicable practice of sheering his sheep on just one side. I mean, what are the chances that the side he sheered would be the one exposed to me as I drove by his pasture? I’m not a statistician, but I wouldn’t think the odds high. Maybe on one or two from the flock, but almost certainly not the entire flock.

On the other hand, I’m not sure I agree with Lewis here either. I don’t believe in ghosts, but if I had personally witnessed anything like a “free-floating, full-bodied, vaporous apparition,” I think I might have to make adjustments in my metaphysical position on the matter.

Nevertheless, Lewis’s thesis (ultimately not about ghosts but about miracles) does not depend on our commitment to empiricism nor on our confidence in our empirical sensations. Lewis’s main point is as follows:

If immediate experience cannot prove or disprove the miraculous [e.g., virgin births, walking on water, dead men rising, etc.], still less can history do so. Many people think one can decide whether a miracle occurred in the past by examining the evidence “according to the ordinary rules of historical inquiry.” But the ordinary rules cannot be worked until we have decided whether miracles are possible, and if so, how probable they are. For if they are impossible, the no amount of historical evidence will convince us … If on the other hand, miracles are not intrinsically improbable, then the existing evidence will be sufficient to convince us that quite a number of miracles have occurred. The result of our historical enquiries thus depends on the philosophical views which we have been holding before we even began to look at the evidence. [7]

I think Dr Tabor is right about the overriding presuppositions of some evangelical Christians: They firmly believe that Jesus bones cannot possibly be lying around in any tomb, and consequently no amount of historical evidence will convince them otherwise. They fall into my first category above. However, I would also suggest that Dr. Tabor’s presupposition about the impossibility of the resurrection (“Dead messiahs don’t come to life”) has predetermined his approach to the historical evidence. He falls into category 4.

Dr. Tabor explicitly concedes that he has brought this presupposition to his historical inquiry. He further concedes that he must “speculate” to piece together an explanation of the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, the proclamation of the resurrection, the origin and growth of the church, etc. without admitting the resurrection of Jesus. Because the rules of rational, scientific historical scholarship preclude admitting the possibility of people being raised from the dead, the modern historian has no choice but to reconstruct a scenario which accounts for the evidence without the theological dogma of Jesus’ resurrection.

I sympathize with the inclination of the modern historian. Naturalism, as C.S. Lewis observes, is “in our bones,” mine included. Dr. Tabor speaks of evangelicals being “culturally conditioned” to believe in such “nonsense.” Perhaps, but we are also “culturally conditioned” to regard it as “nonsense.” We know that “miracles” are the sort of thing that uneducated, superstitious people buy into. We are made of more enlightened and sophisticated stuff. Speaking for myself, there are indeed times when this talk about miracles seems improbable, to say the least. In other words, if we accept the possibility of the miraculous, we do so only in the teeth of our natural – and to some extent culturally conditioned – skepticism. We are naturalists and infidels by habit.

I think skepticism is warranted and is healthy. But natural inclination aside, I would suggest that approaching our historical studies with the dogmatic presupposition that miracles in general, and the resurrection in particular, are not possible (or not probable) is neither scientific nor rational.


Is presumption against resurrection a “scientific worldview”?

A Metaphysical and/or Theological Issue

Frankly, in my experience Christianity Today is not an objective vehicle for reviewing and airing critical reflections and debate on Christian Origins. How could it be otherwise, since the end is always determined from the beginning–the very opposite of scientific and historical processes and method? [8]

The book [The Jesus Dynasty] is wholly an historical investigation, not a theological or dogmatic one, and it rests upon my 35 years as a historian of ancient Judaism and early Christianity. Its presuppositions and methods are those common in the field among historical investigators. [9]

Historians, by definition, operate within the presuppositions of a scientific world view. [10]

I have already conceded that many evangelicals bring their beliefs to their historical studies, myself included. But by his own admission, hasn’t Dr. Tabor done the very thing for which he criticizes the most dogmatic evangelicals? He assumes that “dead messiahs don’t come to life” and then puts together an explanation of Christian origins that denies the resurrection of Jesus. But “how could it be otherwise, since the end is always determined from the beginning?” In what sense is this any more scientific or historical than what many evangelicals do?

Furthermore, I would submit that it doesn’t really matter what presuppositions are common in the field among historical investigators. The criteria for historical inquiry or a “scientific worldview” are not determined by suffrage or discovered in a poll. What is fashionable in the academy is not necessarily that which is scientific, unless of course, one assigns to “science” ad hoc a circular definition. The assumption that resurrection from the dead is not possible or even probable is a metaphysical position, not a scientific one[11]. Furthermore, if the belief that God raised Jesus from the dead is “theological dogma,” then it seems to follow that the denial of that proposition is also theological dogma. In that the assumption against resurrection implies that God is either too apathetic, indolent, dead, or just opposed on principle, it has more to do with speculative theology than with science. If evangelicals are imposing “theological dogma” on their historical inquiry because they insist on the possibility of the resurrection as a historical option, then modern historians who insist that it is impossible are assuming at least an equally dogmatic theological position. Or to put it another way: If the affirmative position on a theological proposition is neither scientific nor historical, then the negative position on the same proposition enjoys no special dispensation.


Not falsifiable by scientific or historical methods

Because the impossibility of resurrection is a metaphysical/theological presupposition that is imposed on one’s historical studies, it cannot be falsified by those studies. As I have pointed out, my belief in the resurrection of Jesus could in principle and in practice be destroyed by a Jesus Family Tomb theory that was less tenuous and speculative. My presumption falls into category 2 above. The problem with both category 1 and category 4 presuppositions – indeed, with metaphysical assumptions in general – is that none of them can be falsified by scientific or historical inquiry. As Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery) has effectively argued, in spite of appearances or claims, hypotheses that cannot be falsified in principle do not qualify as being very scientific. The presupposition that Jesus could not have been raised from the dead may be fashionable in the academic community. I suspect that Dr. Tabor is right: It is fairly common. I do not, however, see how it qualifies as being a tenet in a “scientific worldview.”


Is presupposition against resurrection a “rational” position?

I am convinced that this is the most credible historical explanation of the empty tomb, and it does the best job of accounting for the ways in which the movement survived, went on, and maintained its vitality. And because it is credible, in the end, for rational people, it can be more inspiring than stories of revived corpses and bodies ascending the heaven. [12]

I realize that the question of “faith” and “history” and the assumptions modern historians make in terms of a so-called “materialistic” worldview can be challenged, even philosophically [13]

If the so-called “materialist” or “naturalistic” worldview can be challenged philosophically, then I am not sure I understand why “rational people” will find only a historical explanation of Christian origins “sans resurrection” credible. I know a handful of people I consider to be rational, and by no means all of them deny the possibility of Jesus resurrection on philosophical grounds. I suspect that when one concludes that “rational” people assume “dead bodies don’t rise and walk around,” they are perhaps giving Hume’s argument against miracles too much credit. Once again, I yield the floor to C.S. Lewis:

The ordinary procedure of the modern historian, even if he admits the possibility of miracle, is to admit no particular instance of it until every possibility of “natural” explanation has been tried and failed. That is, he will accept the most improbable “natural” explanations rather than say that a miracle occurred. [14]

Ever since Hume’s famous Essay it has been believed that historical statements about miracles are the most intrinsically improbable of all historical statements. According to Hume, probability rests on what may be called the majority vote of our past experiences. The more often a thing has been known to happen, the more probable it is that it should happen again; and the less often the less probable. Now the regularity of Nature’s course, says Hume, is supported by something better than the majority vote of past experiences: it is supported by their unanimous vote, or as Hume says, by “firm and unalterable experience.” There is, in fact, “uniform experience” against Miracle; otherwise, says Hume, it would not be a miracle. A miracle is therefore the most improbable of all events. It is always more probable that the witnesses [or whoever wrote the document!] were lying or mistaken than that a miracle occurred.

Now of course we must agree with Hume that if there is absolutely “uniform experience” against miracles, if in other words they have never happened, why then they never have. Unfortunately we know the experience against them to be uniform only if we know all the reports to be false. And we can know all the reports to be false only if we know already that miracles have never occurred. In fact, we are arguing in a circle. [15]

The odd thing is that no man knew this better than Hume. His Essay on Miracles is quite inconsistent with the more radical, and honourable, skepticism of his main work. [16]

Circular reasoning, of course, is not rational thought. It only pretends to be. And yet most people’s assumptions against the possibility (or probability) of dead bodies rising and walking around is based – either explicitly or implicitly – on some form of Hume’s argument. Like the slumbering Kant, most philosophers explicitly responding to Hume have been more concerned about his undermining of science than his attempt to undermine faith in miracles. I would suggest that a presupposition of classical theism would solve both problems much better than what Kant came up with. But that issue aside, I’m not sure what basis rational people have for dismissing resurrection from the dead as “nonsense.” Other than culturally conditioned, fashionable thought patterns and a healthy skepticism, what grounds are there for denying it to be a serious metaphysical possibility?


What we have here …

I think our basic presuppositions are so very different on many issues there is simply no room for dialogue … in such [evangelical] circles the normal rules of scholarly engagement and critical discussion are suspended. [17]

Unfortunately, Dr. Tabor may be right. If the normal rules of scholarly engagement include the presupposition that resurrection is impossible (or at least extremely improbable), then those rules will either have to be suspended, or dialogue on the historical issues will have to be suspended while the rules of scholarly and critical discussion are negotiated. But it will be a philosophical discussion, not a historical one. I personally would welcome Dr. Tabor’s contribution to those proceedings. In the meantime, I would suggest that continuing to classify the present rules as the standard for “scientific” and “rational” historical inquiry and to dismiss those who do not recognize them as somehow too silly or superstitious to be taken seriously is neither accurate nor helpful in facilitating scholarly engagement and critical discussion.


[1] Presuppositions, Methods, and Assumptions: The Tomb, March 12, 2007
[2] On Motivations, Methods, and the Evidence, March 4, 2007
[3] Dismantling The Jesus Dynasty, February 14, 2007
[4] Methinks Thou Protestest Too Much, March 5, 2007
[5] Nonsense and the Academic Study of Religion, March 27, 2007
[6] Lewis, C.S. Miracles: A Preliminary Study. Glasgow: Collins, 1987. p. 7
[7] Lewis, C.S. Miracles: A Preliminary Study. Glasgow: Collins, 1987. pp. 7-8
[8] Dismantling The Jesus Dynasty, February 14, 2007
[9] After Easter, April 16, 2006
[10] Nonsense and the Academic Study of Religion, March 27, 2007
[11] If anyone wants to discuss “methodological naturalism,” its epistemological problems (e.g., the truth value of its output), and its applicability to historical studies (which unlike biology or astrophysics has no intrinsic, methodological need to seek “materialistic” or even naturalistic explanations), we can do so.
[12] That Empty Tomb, October 14, 2006
[13] Odd Arguments, July 8, 2006
[14] Lewis, C.S. Miracles: A Preliminary Study. Glasgow: Collins, 1987. 104
[15] Lewis, C.S. Miracles: A Preliminary Study. Glasgow: Collins, 1987. 105-6
[16] Lewis, C.S. Miracles: A Preliminary Study. Glasgow: Collins, 1987. 106-7
[17] Dismantling The Jesus Dynasty, February 14, 2007

Correction with an Apology

I recently posted the following remarks along with a cartoon of the Black Knight (sans appendages) from Monty Python and the Holy Grail defiantly denying he was whipped with the rather well-known shibboleth, "It's only a flesh wound!":

Without any acknowledgement (to my knowledge) of Richard Bauckham's well-researched article, Tabor is back to deriving "Mariamne" from the inscription Mariamenou/Mara, a reading for which there seems to be no basis other than his stock circular one: It supports his creed that this must be Jesus' tomb. Regarding this or any other post of mine, if a reader sees errors in either my statement of facts or my logic, I sincerely request that he/she point it out. A modification and an apology will then be in order and will be forthcoming. I do not wish to be unfair.

It appears that the promised correction and apology are warranted after all. Dr. Tabor has patiently pointed out that (1) my statements of facts are not accurate, that (2) he has never had any other position, and (3) that his basis for his position is and always has been Rahmani's comments on the Mariamenou/Mara inscription.

When Dr. Tabor first pointed out the inaccuracy of my statements, I continued to argue that he had not responded to Bauckham's article, which I thought relevant to the issue. However, I have since found Rahmani's comments and now understand that Bauckham's study and Dr. Tabor's choice not to respond to it in no way supported either the wild-ass assertions I made or the ill-considered rhetoric with which I embellished them. For both of these irresponsible transgressions against "due diligence" as well as against civility and common decency, I sincerely apologize both to Dr. Tabor and to anyone else who might have read my blog.

I still think that Dr. Bauckham's study (link below) strongly suggests that even with the "Mariamne" reading of the inscription, a connecton of the Talpiot the ossuary with Mary Magdalene is by no means established, but that was not the point I made in my post. I asserted that Bauckham's study suggested that the "Mariamne" reading was wrong and that Dr. Tabor needed to reply to it before he "returned" to that position. I was wrong in both statement of fact and in logic, and for that as well as the rude rhetoric, I apologize. I will make every effort to insure that it does not happen again. I do not admire careless and sloppy argumentation, and I admire even less Christians who engage in it, and I am downright contemptuous of Christians who engage in it in a public forum. Add to that the compounding of my offense by failing to participate in public discussion with both "meekness and reverence" ... my only feeble response is that I have no excuse, and I sincerely regret it. I should be made of better stuff. I hope this confession and apology is acceptable to those offended, especially Dr. Tabor. I may have other comments to make on the ongoing discussion in general and Dr. Tabor's arguments specifically, but I will make a diligent effort to practice self-control and exercise a bit more "sweet reason" in my polemics.

Ben Lewis

Richard Bauckham's article can be found at:
http://www.christilling.de/blog/2007/03/guest-post-by-richard-bauckham.html

Tongue Still in Cheek, I Hope

I've just reread Dr. Tabor's revision of the paragraph in question and noticed another interesting modification that has formed in his position. Compare the statement of his position in the original writing to its revised form:

Original Statement
"My own view is that the ossuary of the N.T. “Mary and Martha” has already been found on the Mt. of Olives ..."

Revised Statement
"Up to this point my own view, with Bagatti and others, is that an ossuary that well might refer to the N.T. “Mary and Martha ... has already been found on the Mt. of Olives ..." (emphasis mine). This is a significant modification in the statement of Dr. Tabor’s position, which seems to be exceptionally fluid and elastic construct. I hope his statement that his original remarks were written "tongue in cheek" is also still his position.

I only point out the observable microevolution of his positon so that I can point this out: If Dr. Tabor should further modify his "tongue in cheek" remarks about linking the "Mariamenou/Mara" ossuary with Mary and Matha of Bethany to the point that he adopts it wholesale, then it would seem to me that my original criticism of presuppositional bias and circular reasoning would stand. And it would seem to me that the passion driving Mr. Tabor's obsession with the Talpiot tomb is colored by his apriori, faith-commitment to that tomb being the "Jesus Family tomb."

Swapping One Mary for Another?

Mark Goodacre recently posted on his NTGateway (http://ntgateway.com/weblog/) blog:

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I mentioned earlier (Talpiot Tomb Various) Stephen Pfann's new reading of the "Mariamenou Mara" ossuary. He has published his full reading in a very clear, eight page illustrated PDF:Mary Magdalene is Now Missing:A Corrected Reading of Rahmani Ossuary 701By Stephen J. Pfann, Ph.D.

I have to admit that to my untrained eye, the case is pretty convincing that we should, all along, have been reading this as MARIAME KAI MARA (Mariame and Mara). The thing that is particularly helpful in Pfann's piece is his illustrations of parallels to the way KAI is written here. The article is a model of clarity. But I should stress that I am no expert at all in reading inscriptions, so I am looking forward to hearing the learned reactions of other experts to this interesting new
proposal.

The only thing that puzzles me a little is the title of the piece, "Mary Magdalene is now missing", in that it might be said that Mary Magdalene was never there in the first place, or at least that the case for her identification, even on the previous reading, was weak, as Pfann goes on to note in p. 2 of the current piece. In so far as the new reading provides us with a Mary and a Martha, we have one additional NT related name in the tomb (Luke 10.38-42; John 11-12). As Pfann points out, these are common names ("Yet Another Mary and Martha?", p. 6), so it is still a long way from Simcha Jacobovici's hoped for "Ringo", but the new reading does not detract from a modified case that could be mounted on the basis of a Mary and a Martha, all the more so in that the Acts of Philip, on which the programme makers are keen, assumes that Mary Magdalene and Mary of Bethany are the same person (See Mariamne, Mary Magdalene and Mary of Bethany). I should make clear that I would not want to make such a case, but I point it out for the sake of fairness

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I agree with Mark. In fact, in reaction to Pfann's reading, I posted on Ben Witherington's March 12 blog* that I half expected Tabor to present a Mary Magdalene = Mary of Bethany argument based on the Bovon's interpretation of the Acts of Philip. It would be a tough argument to make since it would have to be based primarily on a record that documents a talking leopard and since (as I understand it) it would have to overcome the geographical difficulties of the now solitary Mary coming from both Magdala and Bethany. Not to mention a brand new ad hoc argument to explain why Mary of Bethany's inscription was written in Greek. On the other hand, the following statements from Tabor yesterday** suggest that he may very well attempt to make it or some other argument equally difficult to make:

Or alternatively, IF we have two names, the proverbial “Mary and Martha,” then every N.T. reader knows these were two of the most intimate sisters in Jesus’ life–indeed, some have suggested that “Mary,” who sat as his feet and was commended by him in Luke, did in fact become his companion. This is the home that Jesus stayed in the last week of his life. This family was the closest to him of any he had in Jerusalem. So ironically, “Mary & Martha” just pushes things all the more toward a “Jesus family tomb.” My own view is that the ossuary of the N.T. “Mary and Martha” has already been found on the Mt. of Olives, where they live. I write of this in my book, The Jesus Dynasty, p. 236.

Among Tabor’s three categories of intellectual disposition on the tomb evidence, the above statements suggest he is in the category that’s pretty sold on this being the “Jesus Family Tomb.”

Accordingly, even if Tabor is wrong about one of his pivotal arguments (that these are the bones of the Honourable Lady Lord Mary) – he doesn’t think he is, but that’s of no real consequence (“It’s just a flesh wound!”) – and it turns out instead that they are the bones of a certain Mary and Martha, then, happily enough, there just so happens to be a Mary and Martha in Jesus’ life. It clearly follows that since this is the tomb of Jesus of Nazareth, these must be the bones of these two sisters, Mary and Martha of Bethany. Of course there’s the small hurdle of his book putting him on record that Mary and Martha’s bones are elsewhere, but the facts in that book are sufficiently flexible, and in the name of truth, he’s already abandoned views expressed in that book for the ultimate good of getting Jesus’ bones in that tomb. After all, his bones are out there somewhere, and this tomb is as good as any and better than most.

If I have mischaracterized Tabor’s “intellectual disposition” here, then why does he even suggest that “Mary & Martha just pushes things all the more toward a Jesus family tomb” if he doesn’t believe that those are the bones of Mary and Martha of Bethany? How can Tabor assert that the Mary & Martha inscription on the Talpiot ossuary in question supports anything about the Jesus family tomb if the bones of Mary and Martha are in the Mt. of Olives tomb, as Tabor believes? Are all his scholarly conclusions so disposable that he is willing to discard any one of them just to get Jesus’ bones in the Talpiot tomb? Ironically enough, he tells us (for all we know, with a straight face), “Some have suggested that Mary [of Bethany] … did in fact become his companion.” Now for the time being, of course, Tabor has Jesus firmly bound in holy wedlock to Mary Magdalene. But if it should turn out that maintaining this position does not reflect favorably on his Jesus Tomb theory, then it is perfectly reasonable, according to Tabor’s “First Principle,” to conclude that Jesus was married to Mary of Bethany. And what’s more, the ossuary previously belonging to Mary Magdalene now belongs to Mary and Martha of Bethany. All of these have now somehow become probable. Otherwise, how does the Mary & Martha inscription magically “push things all the more toward a Jesus family tomb”?

What is Tabor’s “First Principle”? It is "no big mystery.” From his association with the irresponsible claims in the documentary and his writings in the last two weeks, it seems plain for all to see: Any historical probability (e.g., Jesus of Nazareth was not married, Jesus of Nazareth did not have a son, a Jesus the Messiah ossuary would have a real inscription instead of graffiti, the ossuaries would have toponymic markers, the secret of Jesus’ bones would be exposed, etc.) or any of his own previous scholarly conclusions (e.g., the identity of Jesus’ father or the identity of Jesus' wife or identity of the bones in the Mariamene/Mara box) is less probable than his belief that the Talpiot tomb held the bones of Jesus of Nazareth.

I am not advancing an ad homimem argument here against Tabor’s Jesus Tomb theory. His arguments stand or fall on their own merit. I am merely attempting to understand and explain why he has persistently shown himself willing to embrace so enthusiastically (at times dogmatically and at times even desperately) arguments which have so little merit. And of course I’m attempting to put him in one of the three categories of presuppositions he so smugly posted on his Jesus Dynasty web site.

I realize, that as a colleague of Tabor, it would not be appropriate for Mark to agree with my characterization of his "intellectual disposition," I invite him or anyone else to point out any error in my facts or my logic. I am willing to stand corrected.

I posted the substance of this post as a comment on Mark Goodacre's blog, and Tabor has replied that he wrote the paragraph quoted above with "tongue in cheek." OK, but it had that "familiar ring" to it. Several people I've talked to thought he was serious too. I'm glad to have his word that he wasn't.

* http://benwitherington.blogspot.com/2007/03/stephen-pfann-rules-out-mary-magdalene.html

** http://jesusdynasty.com/blog/

FINAL NOTE (hopefully): Today, Tabor has revised his original remarks (revision below). I'm not sure what the qualifier "up to this point" is intended to convey. Perhaps that is just "tongue in cheek" as well.

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A final note: It is interesting that if Pfann were right, and I am not yet confinced thereof, the reading: Mariame and/also Mara can mean in common Greek, even today: Mariame also [know as] Mara [honorable lady], and Mariame is a quite early and common name for Mary Magdalene. Or alternatively, IF we have two names, the proverbial “Mary and Martha,” then every N.T. reader knows these were two of the most intimate sisters in Jesus’ life–indeed, some have suggested that “Mary,” who sat as his feet and was commended by him in Luke, did in fact become his companion. Up to this point my own view, with Bagatti and others, is that an ossuary that well might refer to the N.T. “Mary and Martha,” ( Dominus Flevit #27/burial #70), with clearer indications of two individuals (according to Milik’s reading) rather than two names for one individual, has already been found on the Mt. of Olives, near Bethany where they lived, along with Shimon bar Yonah, Lazarus, and a few others, see The Jesus Dynasty, p. 235-236 and Finegan, The Archaeology of the New Testament, pp. 368. By the way, this Mt. of Olives ossuary has the names repeated twice, one the cover of the lid and on the long side or face, with Miriam one time and Maria the second time, all Aramaic. Tomb 70 is in a little complex off by itself, separated slightly from the main necropolis complex. Shimon bar Yonah was in tomb 79.